Surviving Reconciliation,
From the Social to the Singular [1]
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to think about the voice of the
survivor within national projects of
reconciliation. It approaches this question through looking at the
roles and identities implicit in
the reconciliation process. It argues that reconciliation needs to be
understood in terms of the
Greek notion of the pharmakon,
as a more ambivalent process than some
of its advocates might
imagine. Drawing on the work of Robert Meister and Pierre Klossowski,
it concludes that the
voice of the survivor may not always be served by the reconciliation
process, and that this
implication requires ethical thought.
The 'truth commission' has been
enthusiastically adopted
internationally to promote national
renewal and create more inclusive societies after state repression and
violence. The centrepiece
of the truth commission is individual testimony to suffering.
What happened, happened. But that
it happened cannot be
so easily accepted. I rebel: against
my past, against history, and against a present that places the
incomprehensible in the cold
storage of history and thus falsifies it in a revolting way. Nothing
has healed, and what perhaps
was on the point of healing in 1964 is bursting open again as an
infected wound.
The voice of the survivor is central for projects of
national reconciliation which attempt to deal
with past trauma in order to facilitate a better future. Survivor
testimony performs a number of
key functions in relation to reconciliation. It enables the gathering
of evidence, helps establish
the facts with respect to human rights violations, and legitimates the
reconciliation process as a
whole through the participation of those who have survived, and
therefore witnessed, forms of
atrocity. Inasmuch as reconciliation aims towards nation building, the
acquisition of testimony
fosters the development of consensus, the rule of law and the formation
of a human rights
culture. [2] Reconciliation also allows for the
articulation of an
historical outlook which institutes
a break with past conflict. Survivor testimony plays a crucial role in
establishing the public
record. It offers a first person perspective upon conflict and its
concomitant harms, and is an important means by which to contest
denials of wrongdoing, and secure accountability in the
pursuit of social justice. [3]
Reconciliation tribunals are indebted to those who agree
to make visible their personal suffering. [4]
Individuals may wish to
participate in order to articulate their pain, air their grievances or
name their perpetrators. They might desire justice, revenge and relief
or feel that
they owe the dead a debt of survival which demands address through
testimonial forms of
witnessing. [5] Alternatively, they may speak out for
the good of the
community. Whatever the
motivation, their reasons are their own: "There is no one reason for
telling, nor one way of
telling or listening, nor one type of story." (Weine,
2006, p. xvi).
The survivor of atrocity, like other members of society,
will benefit from a future horizon of
political stability and harmony. Can the same be said of his/her
participation in those very
processes which aim towards such beneficial goals? There is a tendency
on the part of
advocates of reconciliation to represent the giving of testimony as a
form of cure, as a singular
event which can offer release to the survivor of atrocity. This may be
suggested through terms
such as healing, forgiveness or moving on. For example, Desmond Tutu,
the Chair of South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) writes:
For Tutu, reconciliation makes the future possible, by
enabling healing and forgiveness.
Although reconciliation is a social good, there is a
sense in which its benefits come at a cost. This paper represents an
attempt to investigate that cost as it is borne by survivors
participating
in national projects of reconciliation. Survivors may find solace or
therapeutic closure through
participation in truth and reconciliation commissions, however, there
is no guarantee that this
will occur. Jacques Derrida has written of an approach to the Greek
word pharmakon in which
a range of meanings -- remedy, medicine, drug, poison -- are collapsed
into a
single notion of cure;
the remedy. This is a problem of translation. Derrida claims that
whilst the notion of remedy
represents pharmakon's
positive aspect, there is more to the term than
this:
Derrida's reading of pharmakon
aims to maintain its
ambiguity with respect to good or ill, to
preserve the implicit underside of remedial action.
I shall argue that reconciliation can be similarly
understood, in terms of the notion of pharmakon,
as a complex, perhaps
ambivalent, process which can offer healing but at the same
time signifies a negative potential. The ambivalence of reconciliation
ensues from the good that
testimony performs at the collective level as distinct from its
personal cost. I use the term
ambivalence to suggest more than one valence or value, that
reconciliation can simultaneously
embody competing, even conflicting, interests. Too often, social and
singular interest is
collapsed in these matters whereby social good is identified with
individual benefit. Such a
slippage tends to obscure the difference between singularity and
sociality, a difference which
cannot simply be bridged. I offer this position as a remedy to any
idealized notion of survivor
testimony which promises too much to the participant, or worse,
normalizes a pathway of
healing and closure to which the survivor of violence must conform.
Awareness of the implicit
tension between social reunification and individual recovery requires
acknowledgement that
survivors giving testimony may have particular needs that arise in
virtue of giving voice to their
suffering. Rather than imagine that participation in reconciliation
confers healing, the notion of pharmakon
invites a more careful ethical
engagement with those who have already suffered
enough. Reconciliation thus emerges as a form of pharmakon rather than
panacea.
In what follows, I will look at reconciliation as a
transitional process of nation building that
aims to move beyond conflictual difference towards (re)unification. One
way of staging that
transition is to identify the parties to past conflict, assign
differential roles such as victim and
perpetrator, then set the conditions for their dissolution and
reformation. In theory, the
reconciliation process enables former subject positions (victim,
perpetrator) to be relinquished
and reformed according to citizen-based notions of identity. Ideally,
citizenship thereby comes
to be framed according to a new social compact, one which is founded
upon a jointly
acknowledged view of past conflict. What happens to survivors of
political violence according
to these forms of transition? Does giving voice to their suffering
perform the requisite alchemy
of cure on the way to collective renewal?
I will approach this question by looking at the manner
in which reconciliation identifies the
parties to past conflict whilst producing an emergent subject, citizen
of what will become a
posttraumatic society. I will do so through the work of Robert Meister
on the psycho-social
dynamics of transitional justice (Meister
1999; 2005). Meister's work
combines moral
psychology, political theory and psychoanalysis in order to evoke the
dynamics of
reconciliation. He asks the question: how does a nation deal with
historical trauma so as to set
itself upon a pathway of recovery? A central aspect of his work is to
analyze the ways in which
social trauma is made historical; a thing of the past whose recurrence
is collectively resisted. This is what he means by the posttraumatic
the production of collective social attitudes towards
a traumatic past. [6]
Meister looks at the construction of a singular identity
out of antagonistic forms of difference,
according to which, a country is able to engage in postwar
reconstruction. He captures the move
from difference to unity by focusing on transitional forms of
identification. Transitional
identities represent the mobility of group subject positions in
relation to agendas of nation
building. In this context, they occur through imaginary shifts in
identification, fantasies of
collective guilt, attitudes of (mock) reparation, and defense against
the return to prior identities. They function in contrast to
retributive attitudes of psychological splitting in which aggression
towards former enemies is split off and projected onto threatening
others who are consequently
feared as imminent persecutors.
One way of effecting this kind of reconciliation is to
approach the nation as a whole, in terms
which resist the resumption of former hostilities. Meister attributes
such an approach to
Abraham Lincoln. [7] He writes:
The point of this unifying mode of address, according to which everyone
is a
survivor, is to provoke a shift in the
antagonistic identifications associated with the war. If everybody is a
survivor in Lincoln's
terms, each person must give up their old subject positions. Both
victims and perpetrators of
past abuse need to give up their distinct identities so that they can
together become survivors of
slavery and of the war that put an end to it (Meister,1999, pp.139-140).
According to Meister, collective identity is achieved by
perpetrators identifying with victims,
and victims, as a consequence, identifying with the guilt of
perpetrators. This staggered
pathway towards mutual identification enables guilt to be shared
(imaginatively if not actually). The burden of guilt is shared via what
Meister calls a fantasy of collective guilt -- we could have
been perpetrators, just as we Americans are now survivors of slavery
and the Civil War (Meister, 1999,
p.140). Mutual identification involves victims relinquishing
their identity inasmuch as
everyone comes to identify as survivors of a collectively experienced
trauma. It thereby
undermines the dichotomy of victim and perpetrator, creating the
homogeneity of survivorship
necessary for national rebirth. This is what Meister means by the
movement towards
posttraumatic justice. It represents a situation by which a nation is
bound together in its joint
perception of past trauma. [8]
The homogeneity of survivorship functions in contrast to
ongoing conflict and its implicit divisions (Meister,
1999, p.142). If
perpetrators are unable to identify with victims, they can
only fear and hate them, and may consequently dread retaliation. Fear
of retribution fuels
ongoing aggression. It signifies the projection of fear and hatred
which is then felt as
persecution. The problem with ongoing divisions of this sort is that
the war can never be over,
for retaliation is always around the corner. Where fears of retaliation
exist, antagonistic
difference is vulnerable to the slippage between ceasefire, surrender
and annihilation. [9] It is in
the national interest then that perpetrators identify with victims, and
vice-versa, to share in
mutual identification, so as to jointly acknowledge that victims did
suffer abuse or trauma. Once this occurs, the groundwork is laid to
create the social consensus implicit in collective
survivorship. Survivorship, according to this account, is a
psycho-social form of identification --
socially staged -- which aims towards unifying a country formerly
divided
by war. It is the
political means by which a society can reunite in order to begin the
work of postwar
reconstruction. In that sense, it is a social imaginary, trope of
unification.
In terms of moral psychology, the survivor story puts
the beneficiary on an equal moral footing
as the victim: for we are all deemed survivors. The victim's voice can
no longer be heard in this
scenario because the binary logic of victim/perpetrator is superceded
by the social consensus of
citizenship. The emergent identity of survivor is not a
reconceptualization of the victim so as to
promote his/her empowerment. Rather, it represents the effacement of
the victim's specificity
altogether. Meister writes:
The notion of the "nation in recovery" is an important
component of ongoing social cohesion
(Meister 1999, p.135). According to Meister, posttraumatic
reunification has to be maintained. It will always be haunted by a
traumatic past and, to that extent, must defend itself against
recurrence, against the return of an historical repressed. Nations
which have emerged from a
traumatic past need to keep their trauma in the past. They do so
through refusing to revert to
former modes/attitudes of conflict and injury. Meister uses the
metaphor of a recovering
alcoholic who forbids him or herself another drink for fear of
reverting to unbridled alcoholism
(Meister,1999, p.152). The recovering
nation must similarly refuse like
transgressions that
threaten a return to former states of conflict.
This gives us a means to understand Austrian and German
postwar legislation which proscribes Holocaust denial. [10]
These states
took a legislative stance against future acts which
threaten to return their nation to former states of anti-Semitic
destruction. Rather than a mere
denial of free speech, the legislation represents an attempt to secure
ongoing recovery for the
nation state. The historical component of posttraumatic justice
differentiates this kind of
society from those founded on ahistorical forms of liberalism.
If trauma is to be made and kept historical -- a thing of
the past -- the 'nation in recovery' must
resist any return to prior antagonistic attitudes. [11]
In refusing to
entertain the subject positions of
the past, the 'nation in recovery' also forbids the return to the
subject position of the victim. For Meister, collective survivorship
authorizes 'us' to stop listening to the voice of the victim
insofar as this is what it takes to recover' from a traumatic history
and reunite" (Meister, 1999,
p.145). Further, "this stress on unity leaves the specific character of
the slave's experience as a
victim officially unrecognized" (Meister 1999, p.167). If everyone
becomes a survivor, what
about the experience and specificity of those whose survivorship is
founded upon more than the
vicissitudes of national reconstruction? Is the survivor's voice
silenced by the reconciliation
process itself? In one sense this is clearly untrue. Reconciliation
tribunals such as South
Africa's TRC made a huge impact in terms of representing the survivors
and victims of the Apartheid era. The difficulty is that a new kind of
survivor emerges from reconciliation, the
citizen-survivor rather than the survivor of political atrocity. In
Desmond Tutu's words, "all
have been wounded by apartheid" (in Humphrey,
2002, p.108). Inasmuch as
all are addressed by
these inclusive words, a certain specificity is lost, the survivorship
that belongs to former
victims alone. Michael Humphrey writes:
If universal survivorship effaces the specificity of the
survivor of atrocity, what happens to the
voice of the survivor of political violence? Charles Villa-Vicencio
puts the position clearly:
According to this view, former victims are asked to
privilege universal identity over and above
their status as violated persons. Having given testimony, having had
their day in court,
survivors are now enlisted to move on, to "transcend" old hurts in the
name of a future good
national unity and reconciliation. It is little wonder that some
testimonial witnesses have
complex feelings about their experience of speaking out (Henry, 2000).
It is also unsurprising
that the Director of the Trauma Centre for Survivors of Violence and
Torture, Cape Town,
Nomfundo Walaza, bemoans the fate of victims and survivors thus:
It would seem that there is a divergence between the
optimism of reconciliation advocates
such as Tutu who posit the redemptive potential of reconciliation, and
those who fear the
traumatic effects of testimony itself (Rejali,
1994). Overly optimistic
accounts of reconciliation
provide an alibi for themselves by selling testimony as a kind of cure
unto itself. [12]
If testimony were an acknowledged "poison" rather than
"remedy", it would be harder to urge
participation upon survivors of political violence, for who would
assume such a right? More
complicated still is the idea that reconciliation may simultaneously
occupy both axes of the
pharmakon; positive and
negative, remedy and poison. Perhaps we need to
recognize that social
and individual interests may never fully converge. In light of this
possibility, I would like to
consider the work of Pierre Klossowski, whose reading of the corporeal
philosophy of
Nietzsche suggests a radical difference between what happens in a body,
and its expression in
social terms. Like Nietzsche, Klossowski questions the legitimacy of
the social order,
especially its capacity to comprehend human life. Klossowski identifies
a tension between the
social and the singular, between what he calls "the leveling power of
gregarious thought and the
erectile power of particular cases" (Klossowski,
1997, p.12). Gregarious
thought, for
Klossowski, is the means by which bodily states come to be communicated
between subjects. Although we as individuals need gregarious thought in
order to communicate, there is another
dimension to life represented by the dynamic heterogeneity of the
singular. Whilst individuals
may gain social recognition through giving testimony, Klossowski's work
suggests that the intensity of feelings engendered through violence may
never find adequate expression in socially mediated settings. [13] What
finally finds expression is something else, something legitimated by
the authenticity of suffering but which at the same time, turns that
suffering to its
own (social) ends. Klossowski writes:
Klossowski's distinction between the gregarious and the
singular suggests that national trajectories of reconciliation will
inevitably privilege "the herd" in contrast to that which is
"singular, incommensurable, unexchangeable" (Klossowski, 1997, p.60).
Hence the (re)traumatized, the unsatisfied, unreconciled victim is a
potential side effect of the testimonial
cure. Klossowski's work suggests that gregarious agendas of
reconciliation inevitably diverge
from that which is singular and incommensurable. It draws attention to
the specificity of
embodied suffering which can be occluded by overly linguistic
approaches to the articulation of
trauma. [14] Scarry (1985)
and Das (1996) both acknowledge that
language can fail
the body. [15] The complexity of survivor
participation in reconciliation
projects does not mean that
it should not be sought -- posttraumatic nations must deal with human
rights abuses [16] -- but it does
suggest that the benefits of reconciliation at an individual level
should not be exaggerated. The voice of the survivor is a crucial
component of reconciliation, posttraumatic justice and nation
building. But for survivor participation, truth commissions could not
do their work. However,
speaking is a risk, not necessarily a cure. The ethical obligation to
participants who agree to
lend their voice cannot be easily calculated. At minimum, it behoves us
not to idealise their
plight. If testimony is a sacrifice made on the part of former victims
and survivors of atrocity,
then this needs acknowledgment.
Advocates of reconciliation often see it as the way in which the nation is to move on, beyond the trauma of the past, towards a horizon of peaceful coexistence. Testimony contributes to the articulation of human rights abuse such that the nation as a whole can recognize past wrongdoing. Can the past be thereby left behind? What of the legacies of the past in the bodies of the living? Lebbeus Woods has an architectural response to the legacies of war in which he rejects the idea of restoration. In Woods' view, restoring cities to how they were before the war makes them into empty parodies for the consumption of tourists. The problem is that restoration covers up damage:
Wherever buildings are
broken by the explosion of bombs or artillery shells, by fire or
structural collapse, their forms must be respected as an integrity,
embodying a history that
must not be denied. In their damaged states they suggest new forms of
thought and
comprehension, and suggest new conceptions of space that confirm the
potential of the
human to integrate itself, to be whole and free outside of any
predetermined, totalizing
system (Woods, 1993, p.14).
For Woods, the "ragged tears" in walls and floors are
the beginning of new modes of invention, ones that acknowledge past
wounds -- "scabs" and "scars" -- as a basis for future
invention. These represent the creation of "new tissue", a field of
possibility that grows in the
interstices of damage (Woods, 1993,
p.36). If reconciliation were to be
understood in terms of
new tissue, it could be acknowledged that future possibility need not
require the transcendence
of suffering. Rather, the old would co-exist with the new, allowing for
"a deeper level of
construction [which] fuses the new and the old" (Woods, 1993, p.31). In
this way, the voice of
the survivor could participate without any compulsion to transform, to
become other than itself.
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Notes
[1] This paper arises from my experience organizing and participating in a number of reconciliation conferences between 2002 and 2005, in Melbourne, London and Sarajevo. These were organized by the Global Reconciliation Network, of which I am a founding member. They were conceived as attempts to build pathways towards reconciliation in the wake of the September 11th attack in the United States, and its response worldwide. Their staging in different cities had very different qualities. The most recent conference, held in Sarajevo, August 2005, entitled Pathways to Reconciliation and Global Human Rights, offered the most inspiring and challenging situation. At the conference, there were a number of participating individuals who expresses resistance to, or skepticism towards, reconciliation. This prompted me to think about the participation of survivors in reconciliation projects, to understand their resistance and to honor their perspectives. In reconciliation parlance, bearing witness to another's suffering represents the attempt to ethically honor individual testimony. This essay's attempt to theorize ambivalence is a manner of bearing witness in philosophical terms to these many expressions of suffering.
[2] Hesse and Post discuss the extent to which a
functioning rule of
law requires a ‘reciprocity of understanding’ between the governed and
those in power. In their view, these forms of social trust are
crucial if the rule of law is to take hold in societies having a
history of impunity with respect to the violation of human
rights. They write that “inaugurating such a relation [of social
trust between key parties] is a formidable challenge, in which
reconciliation, facilitated by amnesty, may play some role”, (Hesse and
Post 1999. p.20).
[3] This holds not merely for reconciliation but also
for the
collection of evidence for the criminal prosecution of war
crimes. See for example, the role of witnesses in the formulation
of indictments by the ICTY at The Hague. According to the ICTY,
“Victims play a crucial role in the proceedings at the Tribunal as
witnesses, contributing to the process of establishing the truth by
talking to investigators and/or by giving testimony in court. In many
cases, this requires considerable courage on the part of the
witness. To date, over 3,500 witnesses have taken the opportunity
to tell their stories while testifying in court. Through this, they
have contributed to the creation of elements of a historical record.
The Prosecution has also interviewed 1,400 other potential witnesses.”
(http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm)
[4] For
example, the Human Rights Violations Committee of the South African
Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) heard 21,519 victim statements over a
two-year
period. These statements were key to the
TRC Report’s reconstruction of the Apartheid era, including its attempt
to
account for the numerous abductions, disappearances and missing persons
cases
that arose during that time;
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/4_3.pdf.
[5]
See for example, Primo Levi’s work
in relation to witnessing in which he claims that survivors are not the
‘true
witnesses’ but must nevertheless speak on behalf of those who were,
namely
those who were killed and are therefore unable to speak (Levi 1988, p.ix).
[6] Wilhelm
Verwoerd’s description of
[7]
Meister draws upon
[8]
This can be understood as the ‘truth’ component
of truth and reconciliation commissions.
It represents the nation’s acknowledgement of past wrongs. For example, José Zalaquett, a member of
[9]
Meister uses the example of General
Robert E. Lee’s appeal to fellow Confederates to fight on in order to
save
family members from “abject slavery” (Meister,
1999, p.142). The recurrence of the
term slavery is telling
from the point of view of retaliation.
Lee’s proposition that Southerners are vulnerable to enslavement
by the
North echoes the slavery imposed upon African-Americans.
Such is the retaliatory logic of reprisal.
[10] Although
[11]
For example, “the
[12] Villa-Vicencio
for example writes that it can offer “catharsis for some victims and
survivors”
(Villa-Vicencio 2000, p.203), while Humphrey cites the view that
speaking out
is supposed to be a “liberating and empowering act and a step
towards
individual and social healing” (my
emphasis) (Humphrey, 2002, p.107)
[13] This
view is supported by Alcoff and Gray who use Foucault to suggest that
speech
(testimony) always occurs within discursively mediated settings. The difference between their approach and
Klossowski’s is the way in which the body enters the picture. For Klossowski, the body is a site of
multiple, conflictual activities (impulses).
The multiplicity of the body itself is that which resists the
conformity
of linguistic sociality. Its corporeal
activities can never find adequate ‘expression’ in the generalisations
of
language. On Foucault’s account, as
utilised by Alcoff and Gray, discursive formations -- the courtroom,
the confessional,
the truth commission -- represent the means by which the survivor’s
speech can
become appropriated, reinscribed and reinterpreted (Alcoff and Gray, 1993).
[14] There are many accounts of
reconciliation or testimony which emphasize their narrative status (Weine, 2006;
Felman and Laub, 1992; Schaffer and Smith, 2004).
[15] Part
of the difficulty for theorists such as Elaine Scarry is that testimony
occurs
in mediated narrative settings which may be inimitable to the
expression of
pain (Scarry,
1985). Das
(1996) refers to one such setting,
the emergence of Indian nationhood out of the violence of the Partition
in
which more than 100,000 women were abducted and raped: “When asking
women to
narrate their experiences of the Partition, I found a zone of silence
around
the event” (Das, 1996, p. 67).
Das cites
a number of metaphors produced by women; of imbibing a secret poison
which
could not be expressed. What could find
expression was a masculine position concerning the exchange of women
and the
restoration or preservation of honour.
Drawing on Nadia Serematakis’ work on Greek mourning rituals,
Das writes
of the zone between two kinds of death -- one which can be spoken of
and therefore
mourned, the other which can neither be spoken nor heard.
She concludes that the women’s experiences
cannot be told, nor can mourning occur without addressing issues around
the relation
between “pain, language and the body” (p.67).
[16]
If nation states do not address
human rights violations, they risk the outbreak of continuing mob
violence and
revenge. See for example, Roth’s account
of